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Abstract 
Neo-liberalism stands out as one of the most potent contemporary political philosophies.  Neo-
liberal governments re-fashioned states’ economies and neo-liberal ideas came to dominate 
international financial organizations.  Perhaps nowhere are the challenges of translating neo-
liberal theories into policy more apparent than in defence.  The existing institutions and 
practices whereby states produce military power are often anathema to neo-liberal concepts of 
efficiency.  Bureaucratic armed forces and national champion defence firms, within this 
context, clash with neo-liberalism’s ideological hostility to hierarchical-bureaucratic systems 
and belief that market mechanisms generate efficiency.  Neo-liberal governments therefore 
developed policies for applying the philosophy’s economic formulae to defence.  Two broad 
categories of reforms—enhancing inter-firm competition for contracts and outsourcing 
activities to the private sector—emerged as central to the neo-liberal defence agenda.  
Surprisingly, in light of neo-liberal policies’ adoption by militarily active states, no study has 
systematically examined these reforms’ content and impact.  My article fills this lacuna by 
examining the state—the United Kingdom—that most consistently enacted neo-liberal defence 
reforms.  To preview the conclusion, neo-liberalism did not prove the panacea that proponents 
espoused.  This agenda’s internal logic nevertheless drove policymakers, from Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher’s regime (1979-90) onwards, to compensate for the negative externalities 
generated by one set of neo-liberal reforms by introducing further market mechanisms.  Neo-
liberal policies’ initially disappointing outcomes thus resulted in further neo-liberal reforms 
rather than a reassessment of the philosophy’s suitability to this domain.  Nevertheless, each 
of the neo-liberal defence agenda’s two pillars suffered from internal contradictions that 
ultimately stymied their application. 
 
Introduction 
Neo-liberalism stands out as one of the most potent contemporary political 
philosophies.  Neo-liberal governments re-fashioned states’ economies and neo-liberal ideas 
came to dominate international financial organizations.  Lying at neo-liberalism’s core is the 
notion that the rule of law must take precedence over governments’ ability to autonomously 
pursue objectives.  Neo-liberals consequently argue for: the privatization of state-owned 
industries, the diminution of government-run welfare programs, and an end to governmental 
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planning of the economy.  Free markets and capitalist competition will, in principle, better 
fulfil these functions than the state.  This philosophy’s practical application, however, is 
complicated by many neo-liberal theorists’ assertion that governments must actively create 
self-regulating markets, rather than simply relying on laissez-faire dynamics to generate them. 
Perhaps nowhere are the challenges of translating neo-liberal theories into policy more 
apparent than in defence.  Defending society against external threats constitutes one of a small 
number of essential functions that neo-liberal theorists agree government ought to fulfil.  
National security consequently occupies a privileged position in neo-liberal thought as a 
domain where the state legitimately plays the primary role.   
The existing institutions and practices whereby states produce military power, however, 
are often anathema to neo-liberal concepts of efficiency.  Bureaucratic armed forces and 
national champion defence firms, within this context, clash with neo-liberalism’s ideological 
hostility to hierarchical-bureaucratic systems and belief that market mechanisms generate 
efficiency.  Neo-liberal theory’s treatment of national security is thus characterized by the 
paradox that while defence is regarded as a privileged arena for state action, the mechanisms 
that modern societies have developed to fulfil this need are considered inefficient.  Neo-
liberalism’s founding philosophers offered little advice about resolving this contradiction.  It 
therefore fell to neo-liberal governments to develop policies for applying the philosophy’s 
economic formulae to defence.   
Two broad categories of reforms—enhancing inter-firm competition for contracts and 
outsourcing activities to the private sector—emerged as central to the neo-liberal defence 
agenda.  Although rarely presented as such, these reforms present a significant intellectual 
challenge to the hitherto predominant statist model for military power’s provision.  These 
policies were warmly embraced by governments in Britain, Australia, Canada and the United 
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States, and have been partially adopted further afield.  Surprisingly, in light of neo-liberal 
policies’ adoption by militarily active states, no study has systematically examined these 
reforms’ content and impact.  My article fills this lacuna by examining the state—the United 
Kingdom—that most comprehensively and consistently enacted neo-liberal defence reforms.      
To preview the conclusion, neo-liberalism did not prove the panacea that proponents 
espoused.  This agenda’s internal logic nevertheless drove policymakers, from Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher’s regime (1979-90) onwards, to compensate for the negative externalities 
generated by one set of neo-liberal reforms by introducing further market mechanisms.  Neo-
liberal policies’ initially disappointing outcomes thus resulted in further neo-liberal reforms 
rather than a reassessment of the philosophy’s suitability to this domain.  Nevertheless, each 
of the neo-liberal defence agenda’s two pillars suffered from internal contradictions that 
ultimately stymied their application. 
Competition policies initially obliged firms to provide better bids.  Government failed, 
however, to hold firms to the resultant fixed-price contracts because corporations’ credible 
threats to declare bankruptcy would have deprived the state both of needed weapons and 
suppliers from whom to acquire them in the future.  The competition policy, meanwhile, also 
incentivized firms to consolidate into monopolies, which narrowed the scope for future 
competition.  Competition thus followed a parabolic trajectory, with ever higher volumes of 
contracts being awarded competitively from the early-1980s until the mid-1990s, when 
industry consolidation led to a reversal of the trend and an uptake in non-competitive contracts.  
Ultimately, it was a Conservative government that tacitly conceded competition’s failure and 
developed new guidelines for uncompetitive contracts.   
Defence outsourcing, meanwhile, followed an analogous trajectory.  Outsourcing 
simple functions to private firms yielded unambiguous gains, but such outsourcing’s scope was 
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structurally limited because most defence functions involve complex combinations of hardware 
and personnel.  Government therefore sought to expand outsourcing’s scope by developing 
new market mechanisms—including private finance initiatives (PFI) and public private 
partnerships (PPP)—whereby firms could compete to provide ever more complex services.  
The economics and risks of these complex outsourcing efforts proved increasingly problematic, 
such that the most ambitious initiatives either generated financial losses or collapsed. 
Neo-liberalism’s application to defence thus stands out as a political, rather than 
military imperative.  Despite consistent efforts by committed policymakers, neo-liberal reforms 
failed to generate unambiguous benefits and arguably resulted in less efficient outcomes than 
the statist practices they sought to overturn.   
 
Neo-Liberalism’s Reform Agenda 
Neo-liberalism emerged in the 1930s as a philosophical reaction to socialist and social 
democratic theories about how governments should steer economies and provide social 
welfare.  Neo-liberals feared that over-powerful governments would inadvertently destroy 
personal liberty even if they began by pursuing noble objectives.1  Their prescribed antidote 
was the notion that governments should restrict themselves to providing a legal framework and 
competitive markets within which individuals can freely pursue their ends.  While neo-liberal 
thinkers focused primarily on freedom, their philosophy also has clear implications for how 
governments interact with economies.  Three fundamental ideas—distrust of civil servants, a 
                                                          
1 F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 1944), 54-65. 
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belief in markets, and scepticism about state-planned industrial policies—can therefore be said 
to constitute the core of neo-liberal economic reforms.2 
Central to neo-liberalism is its founders’ scepticism of civil servants.  In sharp contrast 
to notions of a “public service ethic” and technocracy, neo-liberals regard civil servants as 
guided by self-interest rather than any sense of public responsibility.  According to James 
Buchanan and Gordon Tulloch, this leads civil servants to expand their bureaucracies’ size and 
the resources they command.3  Bureaucracy’s creeping expansion inevitably comes at society’s 
expense, according to neo-liberals, because civil servants lack the same incentive to act 
efficiently that the fear of bankruptcy provides in the private sector. 
If neo-liberals distrust civil servants, they emphatically value competitive markets.  For 
neo-liberals, markets distribute the economic factors of production—labour and capital—more 
efficiently than any form of central planning.  A population as a whole will consequently 
benefit from the marketization of as many functions as possible, including commodities and 
futures, because competition within markets incentivizes innovation.  Ludwig von Mises 
makes this point most powerfully, arguing that “entrepreneurs” innovate and generate growth 
in competitive market systems while risk-adverse “managers” steer companies in uninspired 
directions in statist systems.4   
Neo-liberals advance other reasons for reducing governments’ economic role besides 
faith in markets and distrust of civil servants.  Milton Friedman, for example, argues that 
governmental expenditure “crowds out” private investment, rather than stimulating economic 
                                                          
2 Raymond Plant, The Neo-liberal State (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 113-71. 
3 James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1962), 11-39. 
4 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (London: William 
Hodge, 1949), 701-06. 
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growth.  This postulate, central to monetarist economics, overturned the dominant Keynesian 
view that governments should ensure full employment.5  Public choice economists, meanwhile, 
argue that government-led industrial policies fail because corporate lobbying and emoluments 
“capture” politicians and bureaucrats.6  Industrial policies, under these circumstances, 
redistribute resources to well-connected, yet un-innovative firms. 
The question of how to translate neo-liberal philosophy into concrete blueprints for 
reforming societies, however, divides neo-liberal theorists.7 
One tradition, pioneered by F.A. Hayek, asserts that self-regulating markets do not 
spring into existence ex nihilo and that governments must proactively create them.8  Thinkers 
from this school, which Philip Mirowski terms “market constructivism” accept that substantial 
areas of human endeavour may suffer from market failure or be inherently difficult to 
marketize.9  For Hayek, the solution lies in replacing traditional bureaucracies with regulatory 
agencies dedicated to enforcing “rules of property, tort and contract.”10  Hayek accords the 
state, through agencies such as these, a central role in curbing monopolistic practices.11  Much 
                                                          
5 Milton Friedman and Anna Schwarz, A Monetary History of the United States: 
1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1963), 639-700. 
6 Francesco Forte, Principles of Public Economics: A Public Choice Approach 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010), 218-237. 
7 Rune Stahl, “Economic Liberalism and the State: Dismantling the Myth of Naïve 
Laissez-Faire,” New Political Economy (2018): DOI: 
doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2018.1458086. 
8 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 18. 
9 Philip Mirowski, “Defining Neoliberalism,” In Philip Mirowski and David Plehwe, 
eds., The Road from Mont Pèlerin (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2009), 417-451.  
10 F.A. Hayek, Law, Liberty and Legislation, Vol. 1 (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1973), 
107. 
11 F.A. Hayek, Law, Liberty and Legislation, Vol. 3 (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1979), 84. 
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of the challenge of governance, for market constructivists, can thus be reduced to “address[ing] 
market failures by providing additional market elements where they were missing.”12   
While Hayek and other market constructivists represent one neo-liberal tradition, 
Milton Friedman and his disciples constitute another, more laissez-faire one.13  In contrast to 
Hayek, laissez-faire neo-liberals are more confident in markets’ self-generating and self-
regulating capacity, and more sceptical about governmental oversight’s impact.  Friedman’s 
description of Hong Kong under British rule as an ideal-type case of markets, entrepreneurship 
and affluence emerging unaided within a minimally-regulated environment exemplifies this 
vision of a polity achieving prosperity under a minimal state. 
Neo-liberal philosophy, taken as an ensemble, thus provides certain common 
prescriptions for reforming economies.  Governments should privatize state-owned industries, 
withdraw from industrial policymaking and eschew Keynesian efforts at mitigating 
unemployment.  Beyond these areas of agreement, though, neo-liberals disagree as to the 
state’s role, with market constructivists asserting the need for activist governments to create 
and uphold markets, while laissez-faire neo-liberals argue the virtues of a more minimal state.  
 
Neo-Liberalism’s Defence Paradox 
National defence occupies a complex and paradoxical position in neo-liberal theory.  
Neo-liberals, in common with classic liberals before them, regard defence as one of a small 
number of essential functions that government must fulfil.  Producing military power is thus a 
                                                          
12 Rachel Turner, Neo-Liberal Ideology: History, Concepts and Policies (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh UP, 2008), 130. 
13 Stahl. 
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legitimate core role of the state.  The institutions that modern states have developed to fulfil 
this function are, however, rife with vices according to neo-liberal theory.  Armed forces are 
archetypical hierarchical-bureaucratic organizations of the sort that neo-liberals regard as 
inherently inefficient, while defence industries’ close relationship to the state are redolent of 
the central planning that neo-liberals abhor.  This raises the question, about which neo-liberal 
theorists wrote remarkably little, as to how the defence sector should be governed. 
Although liberal and neo-liberal theorists differ as to government’s core functions, they 
agree that defending society against external threats constitutes one of those functions.  The 
eighteenth century liberal, Adam Smith, set the tone for subsequent neo-liberal thinking when 
he placed defence amongst the three roles that government must fulfil, along with 
administering justice and providing certain public goods.  In Smith’s words, “According to the 
system of natural liberty, the sovereign [i.e. state] has only three duties to attend to… first, the 
duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies.”14  
Subsequent neo-liberals reiterated this vision of defence as a core governmental responsibility 
and an exception to their desire for an otherwise restricted state.  Hayek, for example, argued 
that, “When an external enemy threatens… powers of compulsory organization, which 
normally nobody possesses, must be granted to somebody [i.e. government].”15  
Defence thus constitutes a privileged domain for governmental activity.  Core elements 
of neo-liberal philosophy, however, are intrinsically anathema to the military institutions that 
modern states possess, which themselves evolved over centuries and in response to warfare’s 
functional requirements.  Modern armed forces, for example, are quintessentially bureaucratic 
and hierarchical organizations, which future commanders join at comparatively young ages and 
                                                          
14 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations IV.ix.51. 
15 Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 3, 124. 
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then progress within over the course of their military careers.  The industrial organizations that 
produce armaments for these militaries, meanwhile, evolved in such a manner as to insulate 
them from ordinary market pressures.   
One reason armaments diverged from other market sectors was militaries’ desire to 
exploit technological opportunities they considered promising, rather than relying on markets’ 
vagaries for suitable weaponry.  Historian William McNeil refers to governments’ efforts to 
foster war-winning technologies as having transformed armaments into a “command 
technology” rather than a conventional technology shaped by supply and demand dynamics.16  
During the Second World War, this governmental involvement in defence technology spurred 
the so-called genesis of “big science,” with government-owned or funded laboratories pushing 
science’s boundaries in pursuit of better weaponry.17 
A second, related reason for armaments’ distinctiveness lies in governments’ need to 
secure adequate supplies of weaponry.  Adam Smith, within this context, argued that states 
should protect and foster defence firms rather than trusting to laissez-faire dynamics.18  
However, since states are frequently too small to sustain enough suppliers for competitive 
market dynamics, the sector is often dominated by strategic interactions between monopsonist 
consumers and monopolistic or oligopolistic producers.  As Merton Park and Frederic Scherer 
opined in a seminal work, this ubiquity of market failure means that, “a market system in its 
entirety can never exist for the acquisition of weapons.”19  This recognition of armaments’ 
                                                          
16 William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1982), 262-383. 
17 James Baxter, Scientists Against Time (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968). 
18 Fanny Coulomb, “Adam Smith: A Defence Economist,” Defence and Peace 
Economics 3/9, (1998), 299–316. 
19 Merton Peck and Frederic Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An 
Economic Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Graduate School of Business, 1962), 57. 
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distinctiveness has led specialists to characterize it as a unique “meso-system” only tangentially 
connected to other economic sectors.20   
Modern militaries’ hierarchical-bureaucratic character and central planning’s centrality 
to armaments’ production are therefore both inimical to neo-liberal conceptions of efficient 
governance.  How then should neo-liberals reconcile the apparent contradiction wherein 
defence is both a critical governmental function, yet states’ ways of fulfilling that function are 
otherwise anathema to neo-liberals?  Neo-liberalism’s founding theorists largely glossed over 
these contradictions and offer little advice on reforming defence.   
Ludwig von Mises, within this context, provided the most influential, yet still unspecific 
advice.  According to Mises, “There is no record of a socialist nation which defeated a capitalist 
nation….  If the efficiency of capitalism is directed by governments toward the output of 
instruments of destruction, the ingenuity of private business turns out weapons which are 
powerful enough to destroy everything.”21  Although Mises refrained from suggesting how to 
improve war-making, his statement implies that states could do so by introducing more 
competitive market dynamics into the process.  Aside from Mises’ non-specific exhortation, 
other neo-liberals largely refrained from advocating defence reforms.   
Conscription alone constitutes a defence issue about which multiple neo-liberals 
expressed opinions.  A former Hayek student, Ronald Hanowy, initiated the conscription 
debate when he argued that mandatory military service was incompatible with individual 
liberty and criticized his former mentor for implying that conscription was one of the forms of 
                                                          
20Claude Serfati, « Le méso-système de l’armement et son impact sur le système 
productif de la France », Ares 13 (1992), 51-84. 
21 Von Mises, 824. 
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“compulsory organization” that the state can legitimately pursue for its defence.22  Hayek 
responded by defending conscription in the following terms, “[T]he use of so severe a form of 
coercion as conscription may be necessary to ward off the danger of worse coercion by an 
external enemy.”23  Milton Friedman, finally, interjected himself into the conscription debate 
by arguing that conscription constitutes an illegitimate “tax in kind” on draftees’ labour under 
ordinary circumstances, but is justifiable when states face existential threats.24  
Neo-liberal theorists rarely advanced specific propositions on defence outside this 
conscription debate.  Milton Friedman and Anna Schwarz provide one counter-example when 
they argued against using defence spending to stimulate economies, a practice known as 
military Keynesianism.25  Otherwise, only one other early thinker associated with neo-
liberalism, Ayn Rand, proposed a significant reform and her proposal, to finance the military 
by levying fees on legal procedures, received short-shrift from peers.26 
Neo-liberal theorists’ comparative silence on defence should not, however, be 
construed as signalling disinterest.  Many had endured personal experiences that made them 
acutely sensitive to such matters.  Both Hayek and Mises fought in the Austro-Hungarian 
military in the First World War and later fled abroad to escape Adolph Hitler’s regime when 
Germany annexed Austria.  Hayek goes so far as to cite the First World War as inspiring his 
study of economics, to understand how such catastrophes occur.  Friedman, meanwhile, 
                                                          
22 Ronald Hanowy, “Hayek’s Concept of Freedom: A Critique,” New Individualist 
Review 1/1 (1961), 28-30. 
23 F.A. Hayek, “Freedom and Coercion,” New Individualist Review 1/2 (1961), 28. 
24 Milton Friedman, “Why Not a Volunteer Army,” New Individualist Review 4/4 
(1967), 3-9. 
25 Friedman and Schwarz, 546-638.   
26 Ayn Rand, “Government Financing in a Free Society,” In The Virtue of Selfishness: 
A New Concept of Egotism (New York: New American Library, 1964), 135-40. 
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worked for the Treasury Department during the Second World War and helped develop the 
payroll withholding system to finance the war.27  Neo-liberalism’s founders should thus not be 
regarded as uninterested in defence, but rather their restraint was the product of their hesitancy 
to pronounce themselves on a domain that they knew to be complex.   
Taken as an ensemble, neo-liberals’ views of national defence and efficient public 
policy create an intellectual imperative for reform.  Neo-liberals regard defence as one of 
governments’ essential and incontestable functions.  The bureaucratic armed forces and state-
steered defence firms that fulfil that function, however, are inimical to neo-liberal concepts of 
efficiency.  Despite the yawning gap between neo-liberals’ prioritization of defence and their 
theories’ scepticism about how states defend themselves, neo-liberalism’s founders refrained 
from advocating specific reforms.  It therefore fell to policymakers to articulate the contours 
of a neo-liberal defence agenda. 
 
Neo-Liberal Governments and Defence Reform 
Reconciling how neo-liberal theory could be applied to the practical question of 
managing a state’s defence therefore had to await neo-liberal governments’ election.  Although 
a coalition of Swedish neo-liberal parties, known as the “bourgeois” block, formed a coalition 
government in 1976, corporatist institutions prevented Sweden’s neo-liberals and their 
compatriots in other coordinated market economies from enacting broad reforms.28  It therefore 
fell to those neo-liberal parties that achieved power in states that already possessed liberal 
                                                          
27 Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Two Lucky People: Memoirs (Chicago: 
Chicago UP, 1999), 122–23. 
28 Desmond King and Stewart Wood, “The Political Economy of Neoliberalism: 
Britain and the United States in the 1980s,” In Herbert Kitschelt et al., Continuity and 
Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 371-380. 
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market economies to translate their ideology into policy.  Britain paved the way in this regard, 
with Margaret Thatcher forming a Conservative government in 1979, but the United States, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand soon followed suit. 
The challenges inherent in managing defence during the 1970s and 1980s, when neo-
liberal parties were winning elections, made the sector appear ripe for reform.  Technological 
developments were driving military platforms’ costs upwards at rates of 6-10% per annum.29  
This cost trend posed a grave challenge to defence planners since a 10% annual increase 
effectively doubles weapon costs every 7.25 years.  Electronics and electronic integration 
account for most of this growth.30  Avionics’ role in fighter aircraft and electronics’ role in 
tanks, for example, increased from 10% in the 1950s to over 50% five decades later.31                 
Weaponry’s ever increasing complexity generated acute planning and management 
challenges.  Rational budgeting and financial planning, within this context, suffered as weapons 
programs ran over-budget and behind schedule.  Britain’s Cabinet Efficiency Unit diagnosed 
this problem’s gravity, calculating that defence projects ran on average 66% over budget, but 
with high levels of variability between projects.32  Militaries, meanwhile, often struggled to 
maintain and use the new, more sophisticated equipment.  The United States’ adoption of a 
                                                          
29 D. Kirkpatrick, “Trends in the Costs of Weapons Systems and the Consequences,” 
Defence and Peace Economics 15/3 (2004), 259-73. 
30 Philip Pugh, “The Procurement Nexus,” Defence Economics 4/2 (1993), 179-94. 
31 Ray Whitford, Fundamentals of Fighter Design (Marlborough: Crowood, 2004), 
20-21; and Jean-Paul Hébert, Production d’armement : Mutation du système français  (Paris: 
documentation Français, 1995), 141. 
32 G. Jordan et al., Learning from Experience: A Report on the Arrangements for 
Managing Major Defence Projects in the Procurement Executive (London: HMSO, 1988). 
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new tank, for example, sent readiness levels plummeting until the US Army developed new 
technical specialties and invested in expensive diagnostic equipment.33 
Given their ideology, neo-liberals diagnosed the roots of states’ defence management 
problem as lying in armed forces’ hierarchical-bureaucratic nature and the role of state planning 
in the armaments sector.  Thatcher’s government in the United Kingdom led the way in 
developing neo-liberal remedies to these problems when it began elaborating its policy, 
labelled Value for Money in Defence Procurement in 1981.  Gradually, however, neo-liberal 
governments in the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand followed suite.34  Neo-
liberal governments’ real-world commitment to reforming defence inspired experts in fields 
such as public choice economics, the New Public Management and Austrian economics to 
examine what neo-liberal defence reforms would actually consist of.35  This drive to reform 
defence began in parallel with neo-liberal efforts to re-imagine other services, such as utilities, 
health care and prisons, where government also traditionally played a primary role. 
In their efforts to reform defence, neo-liberal policymakers consistently sought to 
reduce hierarchical-bureaucratic organizations’ role and to introduce more market dynamics.  
Over time, this effort has given us an entire lexicon of buzzwords representing distinct reform 
efforts, such as “lead-systems integrators,” “value-for-money,” and “smart procurement.”  
Although those neo-liberal defence initiatives bear a wide range of names, they can be 
                                                          
33 Chris Demchak, Military Organizations, Complex Machines: Modernization in the 
U.S. Armed Services (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991), 41-131. 
34 Henry Ergas and Mark Thomson, “More Guns Without Less Butter: Improving 
Australian Defence Efficiency,” Agenda 18/3 (2011), 31-52; and David Detomasi, “The New 
Public Management and Defense Departments: The Case of Canada,” Defense & Security 
Analysis 18/1(2002), 51-73. 
35 Trevor Taylor and Keith Hayward, The UK Defence Industrial Base (London: 
Brassey’s, 1989); and Lawrence Jones and Fred Thompson, Public Management: 
Institutional Renewal for the Twenty-First Century (Stamford: JAI, 1999).  
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functionally divided into two broad categories; measures for increasing competition for defence 
procurement and efforts to outsource defence functions.   
Enhanced competition, according to neo-liberalism, obliges defence firms to offer 
innovative products at better prices.36  Although armaments are a sector where competition is 
notoriously difficult to achieve, developing new market mechanisms can, in principle, resolve 
such challenges.  Market contestability can be promoted, for example, even when only one 
domestic firm can produce a system, by encouraging foreign and non-defence corporations to 
bid for contracts.37  Outsourcing functions to private contractors, meanwhile, fulfils the neo-
liberal objective of reducing hierarchical-bureaucratic organizations’ role in defence.  For neo-
liberals, private entrepreneurs’ greater flexibility and the pressures to win bids should produce 
cost savings and improve military readiness.38  
These neo-liberal defence reforms’ intellectual coherence and their compatibility with 
the economic philosophy that dominated the 1980s and 1990s was such as to recommend them 
to the aforementioned Anglophone states.  Those states that once adopted neo-liberal reforms, 
moreover, have largely continued down this path and academic support for such reforms, 
particularly amongst economists, has grown.  The extent to which neo-liberal reforms called 
for states to revisit military institutions, which were a product of a long historic evolution, 
however dissuaded many governments from adopting them, including those of France, Italy, 
                                                          
36 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and 
Regulation (Cambridge: MIT, 1993). 
37 William Baumol, “Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industrial 
Structure,” American Economic Review, 72/1(1982), 1–15; and Cedric Laguerre, “Is the 
Defence Market Contestable? The Case of Military Aerospace,” Defence and Peace 
Economics, 20/4 (2009), 303-326. 
38 Keith Hartley, “The economics of military outsourcing,” Public Procurement Law 
Review 5(2002), 287–297. 
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Germany, Japan and South Korea.  Surprisingly, in light of this divergence in how democracies 
produce military power, no study to date assesses whether neo-liberal reforms actually 
strengthened states’ military capabilities.    
This study fills this gap by assessing each neo-liberal armament reform’s impact on a 
single state; thereby making it possible to evaluate each reform’s individual effects.  The United 
Kingdom and its air power in particular furnish an ideal case for evaluation.  Britain’s 
Conservative Party embraced neo-liberalism in 1975 as its primary economic ideology and 
began implementing neo-liberal policies after winning power in 1979.39  The United Kingdom 
thereafter embraced the two neo-liberal reforms—competition and outsourcing—sooner and 
more comprehensively than other neo-liberal states.  The nature of British cabinet government, 
as opposed to the United States’ system of divided government, furthermore permitted British 
governments to enact neo-liberal policies more consistently than their American counterparts.40   
An examination of British complex weapons management can, therefore, draw on better 
data, over a longer timeframe, than alternative cases.  This study exploits primary sources, 
including declassified documents from the National Archives (TNA), House of Commons 
(HC) debates, House of Lords (HL) debates, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and National 
Audit Office (NAO) studies to provide the fine-grained detail required to assess British 
reforms’ impact. 
 
Competition Policy’s Rise and Fall 
                                                          
39 Richard Wade, Conservative Party Economic Policy: From Heath in Opposition to 
Cameron in Coalition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 21-31. 
40 King and Wood, 371-397. 
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Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s defence advisors regarded competitive “free 
market” dynamics as central to reforming the acquisition process.  For these officials—who 
included John Nott, Michael Heseltine and Peter Levene—British procurement’s fundamental 
flaw was an excessively “cosy” relationship between the Defence Ministry and arms producing 
firms.41  They excoriated British managers’ inefficiency, which they attributed to complacent 
beliefs that the Defence Ministry would compensate them when projects ran over budget and 
guarantee their solvency with contracts awarded via an informal rotational system known as 
“Buggin’s turn”.42  Thatcher’s officials also decried the government’s and, by extension, the 
civil service’s role in military research.  For these reformers, government scientists wasted 
resources on impractical research that contributed little to military power.43 
Given this analysis, neo-liberal reformers championed market dynamics’ introduction 
into the acquisition process.  The reasons British neo-liberals believed that competition would 
improve efficiency were deeply rooted in neo-liberal theory.  Perhaps foremost amongst these 
was their faith in Mises’ proposition that capitalist competition would generate military 
innovations and economic efficiencies.  Competitive bidding for fixed price contracts would 
therefore, in principle, spur companies to offer more innovative products and cut their 
production costs.44  As a corollary to pushing firms to innovate, planners anticipated that firms 
would invest more of their own funds into research and development (R&D) and that 
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corporations’ R&D departments would operate more efficiently than the Defence Ministry’s 
existing research laboratories.  
Policymakers also calculated that fixed-price contracting mechanisms would resolve 
the moral hazard problems they believed afflicted defence contracting whereby firms failed to 
manage program costs responsibly because they knew the Defence Ministry would bare the 
financial costs when programs ran over budget.  Fixed price contracts could purportedly solve 
this problem by shifting projects’ financial risks onto firms, which would thereby be 
incentivized to behave more efficiently.45  As part and parcel to these changes, policymakers 
also sought to transform Britain’s procurement agency from the sort of hierarchical-
bureaucratic organization that neo-liberals abhor to a regulatory agency of the type Hayek 
championed.  Thatcher’s advisors’ slogan was that they would transform the Defence Ministry 
from a “hands on” to an “eyes on, hands off” approach, which encapsulated their goal of 
disengaging the Defence Ministry from “managing” projects to have it rather simply monitor 
contracts’ fulfilment.46 
Drafting this policy, entitled Value for Money in Defence Procurement, began during 
Nott’s tenure as Defence Minister in 1981.  In theory, Britain would unlock its military-
industrial potential by shifting the responsibility for managing projects from the government 
to firms, and then obliging these firms to compete.  Nott’s successor, Heseltine, estimated that 
this policy would save 10% of Britain’s procurement budget.47  Procurement Chief Levene, 
meanwhile argued that by tendering competitively, on a fixed-price basis, government would 
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force industry to become more “commercially minded” and provide greater “value for 
money.”48  Britain’s reformers further anticipated that their policy would also incentivize 
private companies to enter the sector and invest in defence R&D.49      
Levene demonstrated the government’s commitment to reform when he revisited an 
uncompetitive 1977 cost-plus contract for British Aerospace and GEC to develop the Nimrod 
Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft.  When project costs rose, Levene opened the AEW 
program to competitive bidding and insisted that the new contract be a fixed-price one.  Levene 
encouraged America’s Boeing to bid since Britain lacked other manufacturers capable of 
supplying AEW aircraft.  Ultimately, Boeing won the contract in 1986 with its E3D and the 
Defence Ministry cancelled the Nimrod after investing £600 million in it.50   
Heseltine and Levene subsequently extended competition to a wider range of contracts.  
Whereas 70% of British procurement contracts were non-competitive in 1984-85, 66% were 
allocated competitively by 1986-87 and 80% by the 1990s.51  Competition’s advocates soon 
claimed success, pointing to the growing range of fixed-price contracts.  Levene claimed he 
achieved 10% efficiency gains in British procurement spending while the NAO postulated that 
competition was saving the government £1 billion per year.52 
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The competition policy, however, carried within itself the seeds of its eventual demise.  
By shifting projects’ research burdens and financial risks from governments to firms, this 
policy incentivized defence firms to consolidate.  Indeed, only larger firms could bear the 
financial risks associated with many projects.53  This, for example, became a conundrum when 
the Defence Ministry selected the small, but experienced firm Ferranti to build sophisticated 
airborne radars, but Ferranti’s size undermined its ability to credibly bear the project’s financial 
risks.  Ferranti responded by merging with another defence electronics firm, GEC.54  This 
solution had the virtue of creating an entity large enough to bear the program’s risks, but also 
created a de facto defence electronics monopoly.  Similar dynamics played themselves out 
throughout the Thatcher years, with firms consolidating as a hedge against financial risk and 
to establish domestic monopolies.  Although defence firms also grew larger in other states, the 
trend towards gigantism was more acute in neo-liberal ones.55 
Firms’ consolidation into domestic monopolies rendered further competition 
impossible.  Already, only a minority of aerospace contracts could be tendered competitively 
by the late-1980s and competition thereafter became problematic for land and naval systems 
as well.56  Britain’s neo-liberal policymakers responded to this narrowing of competition’s 
scope by enticing new firms, including both civil non-defence firms and foreign defence firms, 
to enter Britain’s market.  The Defence Ministry consequently published an advice pamphlet, 
Selling to the MoD, and established a Small Firms Advice Office in 1986 to convince non-
                                                          
53 Chin, 104-125. 
54 PREM 19/2935 Tom King, EFA Radar, 22 January 1990. 
55 Chin, 139-140. 
56 Steven Schofield, “The Levene Reforms: An Evaluation,” Defense Analysis, 11/2 
(1995), 154. 
22 
 
defence firms to bid for defence contracts.57  Despite the Ministry’s efforts to reach out to civil 
sector firms, few bid and fewer won major contracts because either they lacked the requisite 
technologies or their business models proved a poor fit for defence. 
Britain’s Defence Ministry compensated for civil firms’ reluctance to enter the market 
by encouraging defence firms from other European states to compete for British contracts and 
championed the so-called 1988 “Action Plan on a stepwise development of a European 
Armaments Market” as a means for doing so.58  When competition occurred after this point it 
largely depended on foreign manufacturers bidding.  These competitions, however, featured 
hypothetical British systems vying against mature foreign ones.  British firms responded by 
submitting unrealistically low bids and optimistic performance targets to obtain contracts, 
hoping to later renegotiate prices upwards.   
Levene’s successor described this tendency, “The company decides they just have to 
win and perhaps you get into a position where they almost want it too much because the 
consequences of the contract getting into trouble several years downstream, ghastly as they are, 
are far less ghastly than not getting the contract.”59  More cynically, BAe Systems’ CEO 
admitted that, “The Company consistently underbid for contracts knowing that it could recover 
the true costs when the project was underway.”60   
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The “firm” fixed prices agreed at contracts’ beginnings therefore proved ephemeral and 
prices subsequently rose in most cases.61  Large domestic projects, such as the ALARM missile 
and Tucano trainer, suffered this fate.62  The Defence Ministry, in turn, failed to enforce fixed-
price contracts because Britain’s defence contractors’ status as domestic monopolists mean that 
they were functionally “too big to fail” insofar as their bankruptcy would both deprive the 
military of important weapons as well as the only domestic supplier capable of providing that 
category of system.63 
Competitions pitting domestic firms against foreign rivals also created situations where 
contracts were not decided on a “value for money” basis.  The Defence Minister concluded in 
certain instances that British industry would lose strategic technical competency if contracts 
were awarded to foreign, rather than domestic, bidders.  Defence Ministers consequently 
overruled the procurement organization on six occasions between 1985 and 1995, ordering 
domestic systems despite foreign bidders offering greater value for money.   
One case involved the government dictating a mixed procurement of indigenous EH101 
and American Chinook helicopters, rather than the more cost-effective purchase of Chinooks 
alone.64  Similarly, the government dictated a mixed policy of purchasing C-130 transport 
aircraft and joining the collaborative Future Large Aircraft project, rather than a more 
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economical purchase of C-130s alone.65  Table 1, below, illustrates the difficulties the Defence 
Ministry faced in applying competition to aerospace projects. 
Table 1: 
UK Aerospace Contracts 
No Competition  Competition, but 
winner selected 
politically 
Competition, but 
price increases / 
renegotiation 
Competition  
Eurofighter (Coll) 
Sea Harrier MLU 
(OD) 
Tornado MLU (OD)  
Harrier T10 (OD) 
Tristar Batch 1 (OD) 
AMRAAM (Imp) 
EH101 ASW (OD) 
F-35 (Coll) 
EH101/CH-47 
(Coll/Imp) 
FLA/C-130J  
(Coll/C-130J) 
ALARM (OD) 
Tucano (LM) 
A400M (Coll) 
 
Apache (LM) 
E3 AEW (Imp) 
ASRAAM (OD) 
C-17 lease (Imp) 
Coll=collaborative projects; Imp=imports; LM=manufacture under license; OD=original 
development; MLU=mid-life upgrade 
   
Scholars reassessed competition in light of the governments’ increasing difficulties 
soliciting competing bids and concluded, overall, that the policy had failed to generate gains.66  
Competition yielded gains on certain projects, such as the Apache helicopter acquisition.  
However, it failed in cases when government either imposed domestic winners or felt obliged 
to renegotiate contracts.  Moreover, the competitive process was inherently expensive.  
Competitive tendering cost companies 3-5% of the value of the contracts they won—
amounting to £400 million per year—and the Defence Ministry’s costs for managing the 
competitions equated to 0.5% contracts’ values.67  In one competition alone, that for a Maritime 
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Patrol Aircraft, the competitive process cost participants a collective £100 million and took two 
years to complete.68  Despite these contracting costs, the procurement effort failed because 
BAe Systems underbid to win and the costs subsequently escalated until the project was 
cancelled 199% over budget.69     
At the same time as competition’s underlying mechanisms—competitive bidding and 
fixed-price contracting—frequently broke down, evidence mounted that the competition policy 
was failing to induce the positive changes in firms’ behaviour that neo-liberals anticipated.  
While policymakers initially intended that competition would spur firms to invest more 
corporate revenues on R&D, the obverse occurred in practice.  Anecdotal evidence for this 
emerged early, with it being argued during Parliamentary debates that “all our major defence 
contractors are quite unwilling even to put pencil to paper on a design unless they were paid in 
advance.”70  By 1987, Britain’s Treasury concluded that the competition policy led “to firms 
playing safe and using conventional rather than advanced technology to meet requirements 
with a corresponding knock-on effect in firms’ ability to undertake research and development 
in the advanced areas.”71   
Over time, the competition policy arguably produced the opposite of what was intended 
in terms of corporate R&D.  Comparative data collected in 2012 demonstrates that Britain’s 
largest defence contractor, BAe Systems, invested a smaller proportion of corporate revenues 
(0.9%) on R&D than other Western defence manufacturers.72  Moreover, rather than being an 
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idiosyncrasy unique to BAe Systems, the same data demonstrate that defence-aerospace firms 
in neo-liberal states consistently invested less in R&D than their equivalents in statist and 
corporatist states.   
The precise mechanisms whereby Britain’s competition policy deters corporate R&D 
investments remains, however, open to debate.  In principle, competition and fixed-price 
contracting’s uneven application may have disincentivized firms from committing R&D funds 
to projects ex ante, before being awarded the contract.  Such would logically occur if firms 
regard their ability to win contracts as unaffected by their R&D investments, but rather 
determined by governmental decisions about whether to procure a weapon domestically.  
Alternatively, corporate strategies that privilege short-term profits by acquiring subsidiaries in 
less risky markets rather than investing in domestic R&D could also account for British firms’ 
inadequate R&D investments.73   
Regardless of the causes, British firms’ anaemic R&D efforts and the government’s 
difficulty in sustaining competitive bidding gradually reached such a level as to threaten the 
competition policy as the centrepiece of British defence procurement.  Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s Labour Party government, which won power in 1997, hired the management consulting 
firm McKinsey & Company to examine Britain’s weapons acquisition system.  McKinsey, in 
turn, drew attention to an over-emphasis on competition and inadequate project management 
on the Defence Ministry’s part.74  Blair’s government responded by reducing competition’s 
scope to simpler weapons.  The government consequently unveiled its new Defence Industrial 
Strategy in 2005, which favoured long-term partnerships between the Defence Ministry and 
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domestic firms, rather than competition, to sustain critical defence-industrial capabilities.  
Aerospace loomed large—particularly aircraft, UAVs, helicopters and guided weapons—in 
this partnership scheme.75 
Blair’s pragmatic de-emphasis of competition, however, suffered a set-back with Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s Conservative government’s election in 2010.  Ideologically 
committed to Thatcher’s legacy, Cameron’s Conservatives felt uncomfortable with the 
partnership initiative.  They therefore promulgated a White Paper, entitled National Security 
Through Technology in 2012, which stridently reaffirmed Thatcher’s competition policy.  This 
document proclaimed, “wherever possible, we will seek to fulfil the UK’s defence and security 
requirements through open competition in the domestic and global market.”76   
This rhetorical reinstatement of a policy widely regarded to have failed sparked 
widespread criticism from Britain’s procurement community.  A focus group organized by the 
Royal United Services Institute encapsulated this sentiment when it declared, “influential 
ministers whose ideological commitment to competition is such that they are incapable and/or 
unwilling of seeing its negative aspects in the specific defence sector.”77  The competition 
policy’s seeming resurgence proved short-lived however.  The same Conservative government 
that issued the 2012 White Paper had already appointed an eminent economist, David Currie, 
to spearhead an inquest into non-competitive contracts.78 
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Currie’s study, which was transmitted to Parliament in October 2011, highlighted non-
competitive contracting’s steady growth.  At the time of Currie’s report, 45% of Defence 
Ministry contracts were awarded non-competitively.79  The actual proportion of major 
equipment contracts awarded non-competitively was much higher, however, since 
competitively-tendered service contracts constitute a large proportion of the procurement 
budget as a result of the government’s outsourcing policy.  Competitively awarded equipment 
contracts, for example, accounted for only 11% and 7% respectively of Defence Ministry 
contracts with BAe Systems and Rolls-Royce by this time.80   
Currie, moreover, argued that Britain managed these non-competitive contracts poorly 
because the Defence Ministry’s focus had been on competition for thirty years.  The Ministry, 
indeed, had not updated its procedures for overseeing non-competitive projects since 1968, 
which meant that these had not been updated to take into account weaponry’s growing 
complexity or the defence industry’s consolidation.81  Currie consequently exhorted Cameron’s 
government to reform non-competitive procurement practices, which already comprised most 
major projects; a process that ultimately bore fruit in the Defence Reform Act of 2014, which 
created a new statutory framework for managing non-competitive procurement and established 
a Single Source Regulations Office to oversee such contracts.82 
Cameron’s government’s adoption of this Act thus signalled the end of Britain’s three 
decade long neo-liberal competition policy.  Although competition and fixed-price contracts 
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appeared to yield substantial gains early on, industry consolidation and the government’s 
inability to enforce contracts once programs ran over budget soon vitiated these 
accomplishments.  Subsequent efforts to revitalize competition by introducing new market 
mechanisms, such as enticing non-defence and foreign firms to bid, failed to salvage the policy.  
In recent years, indeed, the value of British defence contracts awarded non-competitively has 
reached 65-75%, equivalent to those under the pre-Thatcher years of Labour governments.83 
 
Outsourcing’s Promise and Limits 
The Thatcher government pioneered the second major pillar of its neo-liberal reform 
agenda—outsourcing—even as it launched its competition policy.  Initiated in 1983, 
outsourcing, like competition, is predicated on a belief that private entrepreneurship and 
competitive bidding can deliver military support services more efficiently than state 
bureaucracies.  After generating tangible, yet modest savings through a first generation of 
outsourcing, British neo-liberal reformers expanded outsourcing’s scope to more complex 
activities.  Britain’s Defence Ministry consequently unveiled a succession of new outsourcing 
mechanisms, including: lease-back schemes, private finance initiatives (PFI), public private 
partnerships (PPP) and government-owned contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities.  Defence 
outsourcing’s subsequent growth, however, generated disappointing economic outcomes, yet 
retains policymakers’ normative support. 
Defence outsourcing has as its foundation the neo-liberal belief that private sector firms 
can fulfil most roles more efficiently than hierarchical-bureaucratic organizations, such as 
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armed forces.84  Neo-liberal reformers concede that state-organized armed militaries are 
necessary to defend polities and compel soldiers to risk their lives.  They, however, argue that 
the private sector can more efficiently fulfil the multitude of ancillary tasks needed to train and 
support combat units.  Proponents of defence outsourcing consequently aim to disengage state 
bureaucracies from these functions and supplant them with contractors. 
Although the argument for defence outsourcing is rooted in neo-liberal economic 
theory, it runs contrary to how militaries evolved over preceding centuries.  Western military 
history has indeed rather featured the in-sourcing of hitherto private functions by states’ 
hierarchical-bureaucratic militaries.  In-sourcing’s logic lies, in turn, in militaries’ need to 
assure their control over vital support functions.    
Governments first gradually in-sourced combat units during the late-Renaissance and 
Early Modern periods, forming their own infantry regiments rather than hiring mercenary 
bands.85  Louis XIV’s France then led European states in establishing permanent military 
engineering and provisioning bureaucracies.86  It was finally, however, in the nineteenth 
century that most militaries replaced civilian teamsters with military personnel to haul artillery 
onto battlefields.87  Britain’s neo-liberal out-sourcing drive thus tested whether this prior trend 
of in-sourcing was a product of functional battlefield needs or, rather, an unnecessary over-
reach by state bureaucracies. 
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Thatcher’s government embraced outsourcing as part of its neo-liberal critique of 
government.  For Thatcherites, government departments are in-house monopolies that provide 
public services inefficiently.  The absence of competitive pressures and profit incentives are 
the alleged reasons for public actors’ inefficiency.  To solve this, Defence Minister Heseltine 
promoted the outsourcing of military support services beginning in 1983.  His belief in the 
private sectors’ superiority inspired him to decree that support services should be outsourced 
“unless it was operationally necessary or more cost-effective to keep the work in-house.”88  
By 1989 the Ministry outsourced 120 activities.  Many of these impacted the Royal Air 
Force (RAF) and Fleet Air Arm, including: bird control, weather balloon flying, airbase 
engineering and range support.  The outsourcing of activities such as these is comparatively 
straightforward since service levels can be specified and competitive bidding organized.  Table 
2, below, details this first generation of outsourced activities. 
Table 2: 
Simple British Outsourcing Related to Airpower 
Bird control 
Airbase engineering and supplies 
Weather balloon flying 
Range support 
Catering and cleaning 
Availability contracting for combat aircraft 
 
This first generation of outsourcing yielded economies, averaging 5 to 40% per contract.  
Although this represented large relative savings on each activity, outsourcing’s aggregate scope 
remained small.  Simple services only constitute a miniscule proportion of militaries’ inputs 
and most support functions depend on the provision of services requiring the coupling of skilled 
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labour and complex equipment.  Consequently, this first outsourcing drive generated only £50 
million annually in savings; less than 1% of the Defence Ministry’s equipment budget.89 
The clear efficiency gains, yet negligible overall impact of these first outsourcing 
efforts led British policymakers to expand outsourcing’s scope.  The challenge facing British 
neo-liberal reformers was, however, to develop mechanisms for firms to compete to fulfil more 
complex functions that combine services with costly capital assets.  Governmental officials in 
the late-1990s and early-2000s consequently developed four distinct, yet inter-related policies 
for achieving this.   
The first of these, known as lease-back, involved the Defence Ministry selling physical 
infrastructure to corporations and then leasing-back the use of the facilities it had sold along 
with the associated services.  Prime Minister John Major’s Conservative government 
introduced the second outsourcing mechanism, private finance initiatives (PFI), in 1996.  Firms 
engaged in PFIs would raise capital in equity markets with which they would purchase the 
military equipment needed to provide the armed forces complex services.  Firms, in effect, 
would “rent” their capital assets, such as buildings, satellites and transport aircraft, to the armed 
forces along with services. 
Prime Minister Blair’s Labour government sought to innovate upon PFIs in 1997 when 
it introduced public private partnerships (PPP).90  PPPs’ main conceptual advance on PFIs is 
the notion that contracting firms can lease their excess capacity, beyond that contracted for by 
the armed forces, to other clients.  The fourth and final outsourcing mechanism developed by 
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British neo-liberals was the government-owned contractor-operated (GOCO) facility.91  In 
GOCO schemes, the government owns costly physical infrastructure, but contracts with firms 
to provide the services associated with that infrastructure. 
In principle, these four mechanisms—lease-back, PFIs, PPPs and GOCOs—offered 
vehicles for outsourcing more complex defence services.  The economic case for this 
outsourcing, however, is less straightforward than that for the simpler outsourcing that 
preceded it.  States with good credit ratings, such as the United Kingdom, can borrow money 
at far lower interest rates than private sector corporations.92  Outsourcing, consequently, only 
results in savings if firms generate efficiencies of such a scale that they outweigh their higher 
costs of raising capital.   
While higher interest rates pose one problem, asset specificity poses another.  Neo-
liberals’ vision of outsourcing producing economies is rooted in their belief that government 
can sustain a competitive tendering process.  The field of transaction cost economics suggests, 
however, that competition breaks down when actors invest in highly specific assets for their 
commercial relationships.  The equipment associated with complex outsourcing—aerial 
refuelling aircraft, roll-on roll-off ships and fighter simulators—meet these criteria and have 
limited non-military applications.  Transaction cost economists argue that sustaining 
competition for contracts involving such assets is fraught because the signing of one 
outsourcing contract reduces the scope for subsequent competition because “once substantial 
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investments in transaction-specific assets are in place… what was a large numbers bidding 
condition at the outset is effectively transformed into one of bilateral supply thereafter.”93 
Complex outsourcing’s success consequently hinged on neo-liberals’ dual assumptions 
that firms’ superior efficiency would outweigh their greater costs for raising capital and that 
policymakers could develop means for sustaining competition despite high levels of asset 
specificity.  Britain’s Defence Ministry first applied these new mechanisms to outsource 
military housing.  Defence Minister Malcolm Rifkind appointed a team of neo-liberal advisors 
in 1994 to develop plans to sell the Ministry’s 55,000 family accommodation blocks to a private 
firm, which would then rent them back to the Ministry.94   
Neo-liberal reformers anticipated that this lease-back scheme would deliver 
accommodation more efficiently to the armed forces.  However, the Defence Ministry’s own 
accounting office predicted, based on economic modelling, that the lease-back scheme would 
prove less efficient than retaining and managing accommodations in-house.  Britain’s 
Conservative government chose, nevertheless, to proceed with the lease-back plan and invited 
firms to tender in November 1995.95  Ultimately, 19 firms tendered, of which Annington 
Property Limited prevailed, purchasing the Ministry’s housing stock for £1.66 billion and 
concluding a 200-year contract with Britain’s government.96    
Regardless of outsourcing’s long-term impact, the accommodation lease-back scheme 
generated a short-term financial windfall, which spurred reformers to pursue more complex 
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outsourcing.  The next such endeavour addressed the United Kingdom’s need to sea-lift combat 
forces to conflict zones.  Britain’s Conservative government first envisioned contracting for 
the use of two roll-on roll-off (known as “ro-ro”) ships through a PFI.97  The election of Prime 
Minister Blair’s Labour government in 1997, however, led to an expansion of this initiative.  
Rather than securing the use of two ro-ro ships through a PFI, Blair’s Defence Minister Geoff 
Hoon contracted for six through a PPP, in which the firm’s ability to rent the ships to other 
clients when not being used by the armed forces, would purportedly compensate for the higher 
cost of acquiring more ships.98 
Complex outsourcing’s scope continued expanding after this ro-ro ship initiative and 
came to embrace services ever more essential to military efficiency.  In 2003, Britain concluded 
a £2.5 billion contract for Airbus to furnish satellite communications for expeditionary military 
operations via four corporate-owned satellites (Skynet 5) and 150 satellite reception 
terminals.99  In 2004-07, the Ministry concluded further contracts valued at £3.6 billion, that 
shifted aircraft depot maintenance from an in-house RAF activity to one conducted by 
contractors.  These contracts changed the metrics for conducting maintenance from the number 
of repairs implemented to the availability of the aircraft fleet.100   
Then, in 2008, the Ministry signed two massive PFI/PPP contracts.  One of these, a 
£6.8 billion contract, outsourced the armed forces’ core flight training to a private consortium 
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for 25 years.101  The other contract, even larger at £10.5 billion, provided for a private 
consortium, AirTanker, to supply the Defence Ministry’s air-to-air refuelling and passenger air 
transport needs for 27 years.102  Table 3, below, details Britain’s complex outsourcing contracts 
as they pertain to air power. 
Table 3: 
Complex British Defence Outsourcing Related to Airpower 
RAF base family quarters 
E3D Simulator 
Light aircraft flying training 
Hawk trainer simulation facility 
Medium helicopter aircrew training facility 
Lynx helicopter aircrew training service 
Defence helicopter flying school 
Attack helicopter training 
UK Military Flying Training System 
Satellite communications (Skynet 5) 
Airborne tanker and transport fleet 
 
 
Consequently, private firms now train British pilots, house their families, service their aircraft, 
furnish satellite communications for military interventions and refuel aircraft before they strike 
overseas targets. 
The new mechanisms developed by neo-liberal reformers were thus achieving their 
objective of opening up an ever wider range of defence functions to private firms.  Economist 
Peter MacDonald, indeed, calculates that defence outsourcing grew on average by 3.6% per 
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year, between 1996 and 2008, during this era of complex outsourcing.103  This outsourcing’s 
aggregate impact was such that by 2013 Britain’s Defence Ministry was spending 27% of its 
budget on outsourced services, which dwarfed Europe’s other major powers, whose 
outsourcing expenditures averaged 0-2% of their defence budgets.104  British outsourcing’s 
scope also outpaced that of the United States, which had launched its own neo-liberal 
outsourcing drive in 1985, only two years after Britain.  An Anglo-American conference 
consequently concluded that “the UK had been more aggressive than the USA in pursuing such 
private sector involvement.”105     
Britain’s accomplishment at outsourcing ever more functions, however, came even as 
its highest profile outsourcing arrangements began revealing their inherent drawbacks.  The 
lease-back contract for military housing, for example, slowly proved a financial debacle.  
Having become the monopolistic provider of British military housing, Annington 
underinvested in property maintenance to improve its profit margins, which resulted in over 
half of military families reporting themselves dissatisfied with the state of the Addington-
provided accommodations.106  The Annington contract’s increasing cost, combined with the 
opportunity costs associated with the Ministry having sold off its housing estate, led Britain’s 
NAO to calculate that lease-back cost the Defence Ministry £4.17 billion in losses.107 
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At the same time as the accommodation lease-back scheme cast doubt on out-sourcing’s 
economics, the mid-air disintegration of a contractor-maintained Nimrod reconnaissance 
aircraft over Afghanistan in 2006, killing all 14 crewmembers, raised questions about its 
military viability.  The ensuing investigation found that the contractors—BAe Systems and 
QinetiQ—cut corners to meet budgetary targets.  According to the report, 
BAE Systems bears substantial responsibility for the failure of the Nimrod Safety 
Case. Phases 1 and 2 were poorly planned, poorly managed and poorly executed, 
work was rushed and corners were cut. The end product was seriously defective….  
These matters raised question marks about the prevailing ethical culture at BAE 
Systems…. There was a shift in culture and priorities in the MOD [Ministry of 
Defence] towards ‘business’ and financial targets, at the expense of functional 
values such as safety and airworthiness.108 
Although only a single incident, the mid-flight breakup of such an aircraft is exceptional 
enough to raise concerns.  Analysts consequently argued that the Nimrod crash demonstrates 
inherent problems in relying on contractors when their behaviour is difficult to monitor and 
firms have incentives to reduce costs.109 
Neither the unfolding controversy over the housing scheme nor the Nimrod’s 
disintegration dampened neo-liberal reformers’ enthusiasm for complex outsourcing.  Britain’s 
Government, indeed, concluded its largest PPP deal—the £10.5 billion airborne tanker and 
transport contract—in 2008, two years after the Nimrod’s disintegration.  This contract’s high 
capital cost, involving the acquisition of 14 tanker aircraft, cast doubt however on private firms’ 
ability to generate efficiencies sufficient to counterbalance their high capital costs.  Both the 
Defence Ministry’s accounting office and the NAO, indeed, calculated that a straightforward 
tanker purchase by the air force would have been more cost-effective, less complicated, and 
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would have provided more flexible capabilities.110  Governmental ministers’ normative belief 
that the private sector can deliver services more efficiently, however, led them to over-ride 
their own specialized agencies and outsource aerial refuelling.111 
While the refuelling deal set new records for a contract’s size, it was Prime Minister 
Cameron’s subsequent Conservative government that attempted the boldest outsourcing effort 
yet.  The competition policy’s failure and, most specifically, the government’s inability to hold 
firms to their fixed-price contracts, generated a situation whereby future anticipated defence 
expenditures outpaced Britain’s planned defence budgets by a considerable margin.  Rather 
than reassess Britain’s procurement programs, however, Cameron’s government blamed this 
“overheated” procurement environment on a state bureaucracy, the Defence Equipment and 
Supply (or DE&S) organization.112   
Defence Minister Philip Hammond consequently advanced the ambitiously neo-liberal 
idea of outsourcing the management of British defence procurement to the private sector.  The 
specific scheme he proposed in 2013 was to replace the Defence Ministry’s DE&S with a 
government-owned contractor-operated (GOCO) entity, wherein the Ministry would own the 
physical infrastructure, but a private firm would assume responsibility for assuring that 
weapons were delivered at price and on time.113  Britain’s Treasury considered the proposal 
“highly risky” and the NAO doubted whether it was economically advantageous given contract 
labourers’ higher costs compared to civil servants.114 
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Conservative ministers, however, overruled these dissenting opinions and pushed 
forward the GOCO proposal as the Defence Ministry’s official position in July 2012.115  The 
Defence Ministry, indeed, spent £33 million on developing the GOCO idea and developing 
contractual tools for managing such an arrangement.116  This bold outsourcing effort collapsed, 
however, despite unflagging governmental support because private sector firms regarded it as 
too potentially risky.  Only one firm, indeed, submitted a bid for the contract in December 2013 
and, in the absence of the slightest competition, Britain’s cabinet reluctantly concluded that it 
could not persevere with the GOCO.117     
Britain’s defence outsourcing experience highlights, in sum, the possibilities and limits 
of this neo-liberal policy.  Simple support services—such as catering, depot maintenance and 
ancillary activities—can be provided more efficiently by the private sector than the state.  
Services that meet these criteria, however, comprise a miniscule proportion of modern states’ 
defence budgets.  Neo-liberal reformers nonetheless pioneered mechanisms—lease-backs, 
PFIs, PPPs and GOCOs—for outsourcing more complex activities.  While these policy 
innovations enabled neo-liberals to expand outsourcing’s scope, private firms failed to provide 
the anticipated efficiency gains.  The prior historic trend of in-sourcing, whereby governments 
undertook an increasing variety of defence-related tasks in-house, thus appears validated for 
the wide range of defence tasks, which involve costly capital goods and where contracts are 
difficult to monitor. 
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Conclusion 
Neo-liberal policymakers, in sum, enacted the late-twentieth century’s boldest attempt 
to redefine how democracies provide for their defence when the United States, Britain, 
Australia and Canada embraced neo-liberal reforms.  The political leaders who backed these 
reforms drew upon neo-liberalism’s broader framework, including distrust in civil servants and 
faith in competitive markets, to develop their policy initiatives.  The result was a reform agenda 
centred on subjecting firms to greater competitive pressures and outsourcing defence functions 
to the private sector.  This reform effort’s promulgation, in turn, reveals much about both the 
relationship between neo-liberal theory and policy, and about the distinctive nature of defence 
as a particular form of public good. 
One of this study’s revelations is the disjuncture between neo-liberal theorists and 
practitioners.  Neo-liberalism’s founding theorists—Hayek, Mises and Friedman for 
example—regarded defence as one of government’s central responsibilities and they 
normatively accorded it greater powers of compulsory organization than in other domains.  
Most neo-liberal theorists also likely joined Mises in believing that government can generate 
military power more efficiently by tapping firms’ competitive impulses.   
These founding theorists, however, refrained from advocating specific defence reforms.  
To a degree, their own personal experiences with war’s complexity and tragedy may have 
instilled in them a certain modesty about defence.  The indeterminacy of neo-liberal economic 
models for a sector such as defence, where public procurement, finance, and transaction cost 
scholars advanced countervailing arguments, may also have dissuaded them from claiming 
more intellectual authority over this domain.  
Neo-liberal politicians and policymakers, however, exhibited none of this restraint once 
they won elections and formed governments.  In power, neo-liberals operationalized and built-
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upon neo-liberal economics’ precepts to promulgate a far-reaching reform agenda.  Faith in 
competition, distrust in civil servants and a belief in the necessity to transform hierarchical-
bureaucratic organizations into regulatory institutions suffused their reforms.  The result has 
been a three decade long neo-liberal drive to transform defence.  This drive’s two 
components—enhancing inter-firm competition for contracts and outsourcing activities to the 
private sector—run contrary to how defence had evolved in modern democracies.  Western 
military history, indeed, had largely been one of states’ hierarchical-bureaucratic militaries in-
sourcing an ever larger number of functions and governments developing close collaborative 
relationships with arms producing firms.   
Neo-liberal defence reformers’ efforts therefore unknowingly raised the philosophical 
question as to whether defence institutions, as they stood, were the result of warfare’s 
functional necessities, as expressed through repeated conflicts, or the expansionist instincts of 
self-interested military bureaucracies.  That neo-liberal reforms produced significant adverse 
consequences when pursued beyond a certain minimal level consequently suggests that the 
former is more correct that the latter. 
Finally, although the above study focused on the United Kingdom’s neo-liberal defence 
reforms, the British experience is broadly reflective of those of other neo-liberal states.  The 
United States, for example, initiated neo-liberal defence reforms in 1985, several years after 
the United Kingdom, with the logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP).  America’s 
Defence Department under Donald Rumsfeld later sought to shift responsibility for weaponry 
programs onto firms with the lead systems integrator (LSI) initiative and expand outsourcing 
to combat tasks.  As with their British counterparts, these policies either failed or became mired 
in controversy.  The LSI initiative collapsed when its highest profile projects—the Army’s 
Future Combat System and Coast Guard’s “Deep Water” program—ran dramatically over 
budget.  The United States’ outsourcing drive, meanwhile, generated immense controversy as 
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private military companies’ activities in Iraq and Afghanistan led to civilian deaths and raised 
troubling questions about armed contractors’ accountability. 
Despite neo-liberal reforms’ failure to positively transform defence, it would be 
premature to conclude that neo-liberalism’s epoch as an inspiration to would-be defence 
reformers is over.  Neo-liberal policymakers, indeed, can oftentimes rationalize one set of 
reforms’ failure by arguing that new market mechanisms must be developed and introduced.  
The conceptual answer to neo-liberal policy failures thus oftentimes lies in more neo-
liberalism.  Mirowski demonstrates how this intellectual flexibility enabled neo-liberalism to 
broadly survive the 2008 Financial Crisis as a potent ideology and there are no reasons for 
assuming it will be less resilient in the defence sector.118  
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